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WHAT ARE WE EXPECTED TO FEEL? WITNESS, TEXTUALITY AND THE AUDIOVISUAL

Digital technologies have laid bare the double nature of the photographic and recorded sound. Every time the record button is pressed, a document is created. There is human intervention (someone presses a button) and a controllable technology creates an artefact, a document. Real events take place in front of the lens and the microphone; digital recorders create files which can be copied, dispatched around the world and extensively manipulated, subject only to the vagaries of software design and availability of internet access. From the outset, this is a doubly double process: it involves human activity and a technology in creating an artefact from real events.

Digital technology has altered the photographer’s relationship with the recording device and the events being recorded. Gone is the eye jammed to the viewfinder, and with it the need for the special skill of the documentary cameraperson to keep ‘the other eye open’ to spot events developing beyond the edge of the frame. There is no need: the handheld camera can be held away from the body, already at a distance, already showing the finished electronic image. With digital stills, the arms-length camera has become the standard way of taking photos, at least amongst non-professional users; and it is ubiquitous with camcorder users. The live image is always already framed and screened on the digital viewfinder. The image-object, the document, is visible at the moment of its creation.  

This has two important consequences. First, photographers can have a more direct relationship with the event. They are able to make eye contact with their subjects and relate more fully; they can feel more a part of the event, being less dominated by the distancing effect of the camera apparatus. Second, the image of that event is present at the same time as the event: the pro-filmic event and its filmic representation co-exist. With the ubiquity of digital photography, this experience has become commonplace. People who consume recorded images now have experience of the process of producing them as well, if only for their own family use. We experience the images as ‘like’ the event, and can make them as ‘like’ it as possible since they can be adjusted to emphasise their real-ness​[1]​. Yet in doing so we treat them also and immediately as objects; as document in their own right.  This now ordinary experience has changed the general cultural understanding of moving images. The true role of human agency in the processes of creating digital images has finally become apparent in those media cultures in which consumer digital photographic technologies are widespread. 

We appreciate that recorded sound and image exhibit two features that seem contradictory. The photographic and the phonographic provide an immediate effect of ‘thereness’. Yet equally they are experienced within an overarching appreciation that they are always and already textual. ‘Thereness’ is a felt effect, an almost involuntary response to seeing lifelike moving images with synchronised sound; yet we know that these recordings have been willed into existence through human activity. They are textual: constructs that are the effect both of specific work and of pre-existent forms. 

The effect of the real strikes even the most cynical viewer immediately. Recorded or relayed images and sounds have an immediacy and presence that cannot simply be denied. This immediacy still has the capacity to astonish and terrify (as the live TV events of 9/11 in New York or 7/7 in London demonstrated once again). It equally underlies the most commonplace effects of direct address in television. Immediacy appears to be a potent effect of the photo- and phono-graphic that remains despite all the obvious calculated interventions from human and machine that bring it about. We see and we hear. These sensations feel to be similar to our seeing and hearing in everyday situations, even though at the same time we are perfectly aware that we are watching because we have just changed channels, and know perfectly well that what we are perceiving comes in a convenient package. The audiovisual is at once textual and real. If this striking paradox did not exist, documentary would not be possible. 

The paradox lies in the word ‘screen’ itself, as many writers have realised. A screen is a means of display but also of concealment. Behind the screen lie the mechanisms that brings you the pictures and the sounds, concealed by the very thing that they bring into existence. Fundamental to the design of film cameras and projectors is the shutter: the device that conceals every second instant from the dispassionate gaze of the camera. Installed in projectors to reduce flicker, it conceals again a fragment of an instant from the viewer. The paradoxical nature of the photographic was once an insight gained through much reflection and theory. The widespread use of digital technology has made it an accessible insight. We know that any recording is at once real and textual: the two aspects are, to borrow Saussure’s simile, like the two sides of a piece of paper.

The textual nature of the audiovisual causes many anxieties, which relate to the nature of human intervention into the technical processes of the audiovisual. Human intervention may harm the ‘thereness’ or evidential qualities of the recording. It implies ‘manipulation’, a term which, possibly, is losing its negative connotations. Manipulation is expected nowadays: any self-respecting viewer will want documentary material that has undergone a process of proper textual construction. Anxieties arise when too much construction has taken place; that is when the textual nature of the material has been exploited at the expense of the reality effect that it carries. The concern is that human intervention has been too great, to the extent that the evidential effect of the image has been compromised. Such are the worries examined by Feitveld and others around digital photography​[2]​. It also lies behind Baudrillard’s much-misquoted insight that “the Gulf War did not take place”​[3]​ insofar as it addresses the televisual coverage of the 1990 Gulf War. This, famously, was a war in which the TV cameras were kept well away from the action on the ground, to be replaced by imagery of remotely directed bombing silently destroying targets. This imagery purported to show what it did not show: a war taking place in Kuwait and Iraq. Human agency was drained out of this material. There was no evidence of a cameraperson, let alone any victims. It was all text, all construction and no reality effect. If a war was taking place, then it seemed that it was taking place away from cameras operated by trained journalists. For the second Gulf War, a more sophisticated media strategy was adopted which ensured plenty of believable material from reporters on the ground. 

The issue of believability and trust seems to be crucial in ensuring that acceptable or expected manipulation has taken place. The reality effect of audiovisual material remains striking, but it is also fragile. It crucially depends on known or assessable levels of human intervention both in the making of the recording and in its subsequent incorporation into larger texts. Hence the importance of discussions about documentary material and how it is obtained, about the level of intervention by ‘crew’​[4]​ into the events being recorded. There is a growing sophistication within the documentary profession itself (in, for example, the BBC’s Guidelines​[5]​); in the many books which have appeared about documentary (a genre which once seemed to present insuperable difficulties for analytic work); and in a demonstrably greater sophistication in the viewing public (as documented by Annette Hill and others​[6]​). Sometimes all three current come together in press-led controversies about the ethical status of particular documentaries​[7]​. The unacceptable editing of material can have drastic consequences. The controller of BBC1, Peter Fincham, was forced to resign in 2007 because of an editing continuity error in material that was not even broadcast. At the launch of the autumn schedule, he presented a trailer for a forthcoming prestige series ‘A Year with the Queen’. The trailer seemed to show the Queen storming out of a photoshoot with Annie Liebowitz. In fact, the footage was edited in the incorrect order. Footage which captured the Queen’s grumbling on the way into the session about the uncomfortable nature of her ceremonial robes was transmuted into a complaint about the photographer. In a satirical context, such editing would be acceptable. But in a factual context, it clearly breached expectations about the proper use of material. Fincham was forced to resign. The executive producer Stephen Lambert resigned from the production company RDF. RDF had several big contracts cancelled by the BBC and other broadcasters. The BBC took direct control of the programmes and re-edited them as ‘Monarchy: The Royal Family at Work’ (BBC1 2008). ‘Trust’ in television was deemed to have suffered a serious blow​[8]​ as ‘standards’ seemed to have slipped.

The standards concerned are those of acceptable human intervention into the material that is recorded by digital technologies; of the acceptable textual work that can take place to enhance and render intelligible material that carries a sense of ‘thereness’. Digital technologies have not only made the collection of such recordings easier. They also depend on human agency to guarantee their effectivity and meaning. In the area of moving image and sound, easy digital technology has had the paradoxical effect of making human agency a crucial part of the process. It has freed the photographer from the limitations of the viewfinder, enabling a greater participation in the photographed event. It has also made the crucial the need for a chain of guarantee of the reality of these recordings, to ensure that their textual aspect has not overwhelmed their witnessing aspect. This chain of guarantee is often assured by an institution which sets standards and oversees the entire production process. Hence the digital makes public service broadcasting a desirable feature of the new landscape of digital television. It enables institutions to exist that can guarantee this chain of trust in edited material.​[9]​

 The digital has made necessary an enhanced understanding of the role of human agency in the creation of moving image material, and the need for a moral agency which brings specific values to bear. The mechanical process of recording alone is no longer enough guarantee of the reality effect of the recorded material. Equally, it has brought forward the need for an understanding of the moral agency involved in viewing of audiovisual material. 

The reality effect of moving images and sounds invokes many of the emotions that we experience during direct encounters in our lived spaces. The textual nature of moving images and sounds profoundly alters these emotions. The people and events, utterances and appearances that we meet in the audiovisual realm feel similar to direct encounters, even as we know them to be distanced and observed encounters. We enjoy this distance, giving as it does a mobility of gaze that we could not have in the real. We witness events in the audiovisual from many points of view. This is the wonder of editing in fictional texts and, in factual material, the compilation of news and documentary material from many different sources. This mobility of vision enables our activity of witnessing, but at the cost of being unable to intervene. We can feel, but always already within a structure that gives both more and less than we would gain from a real encounter​[10]​.

Any material that claims a documentary status involves its viewers in two conjoined activities: that of witness and that of being addressed. The relation of witness is underwritten by a belief that relatively explicit values of trust have guided all human interventions in the rendering of that material into a text. All of these interventions have constructed an address to the witnessing viewer. This address does more than simply say ‘these things happened (or are happening)’. It is an address to the witnessing viewer as a moral agent. Hence it is legitimate to ask of this address: “what are we expected to feel?”


In many of the discussions of the concept of witness, the consideration of the feelings provoked by the activity is effectively collapsed into a narrow range. Witness implies witness of suffering​[11]​. The discussion is then drawn into the terrain of Arendt’s distinction between compassion and pity, and Boltanski’s consideration of the nature of distant suffering.  The distant yet compelling witness of suffering that has been enabled by the audiovisual is certainly one of the more pressing concerns of our time. Everyone has their own private list of horrors from the past few years witnessed on TV, whether they be traffic accidents or 9/11, mass famine or attempted genocides, images of torture or of inconsolable grief. The feelings that these encounters have provoked – and, for many, continue to provoke - receive an uncertain reply from much audiovisual theory. There are many good reasons why this is so. Many theorists are reluctant to endorse a desire to protect children that seems to slide into calls for censorship; the criticism that suffering is cheapened by its audiovisual transmission to remote people and places seems to deny both the power of the media and the sincerity of the feelings which are sometimes (but not always) provoked. Nevertheless, audiovisual theory has to address these issues directly.

My current concern is to stress that the witness of distant suffering is not qualitatively different from a more general form of witness that underpins the audiovisual. It shocks and appals; we would rather not look at the images or listen to the accounts. But it is not different in status from witnessing more mundane or less disturbing events. Indeed, the witness of distant suffering depends for its efficacy on what we witness in much more mundane audiovisual encounters. Everyday mundane witness underpins the exceptional moments of audiovisual shock: the first encounter with images from Abu Graib, footage of starvation in Africa or police brutality closer to home. I wish to argue that there exists a continuum between a mundane sofa interview on a light topic on breakfast TV and massacre footage. In each case the footage is interrogated in almost the same instant as it is felt. Its textual nature is probed for the proof of its authenticity and for explanations (or at least context) for the witnessed events that evoke emotions. Annette Hill’s research on audience responses at the turn of the millennium has shown how sophisticated and even forensic ordinary viewers now are​[12]​. Helen Wood’s pioneering work has examined the dialogic interplay that viewers have with daytime talk shows​[13]​. Both these pioneering pieces of empirical research tend to support the thesis that televisual witness involves a complex to and fro between seeing, believing and feeling in today’s active viewers. The compassion and pity experienced, most of the time, on witnessing traumatic footage should therefore be considered as subsets of a more general emotional process: the process of empathy. 

Empathy is a relatively new word, entering the language at the beginning of the twentieth century. It seeks to designate the ability to experience the emotions of others as your own, of feeling as an other does. As a term, it seems to be used in ways that assume that a ‘proper distance’ is maintained, that feeling as an other does is not to imply some merging with that other. The self is maintained even as the other is experienced. In Hoffman’s definition, empathy is “an affective response more appropriate to another’s situation than one’s own”​[14]​. The term emerged in experimental psychology and aesthetics more or less simultaneously​[15]​. It has proved to be particularly valuable as a description of the psychotherapeutic process, yet has, but its very usefulness, become somewhat diffuse in meaning. A recent review of the literature in the field, whilst seeking to discern empirical tests of the process in the therapeutic setting, usefully proposes “that researchers use intellectual empathy to refer to the cognitive process and empathic emotions to refer to the affective aspect of empathic experience”​[16]​. This implies that empathy be seen as both an immediate ‘involuntary’ response and a process that involves reflection or a considered projection of self into the place of another. Empathy is therefore potentially a process with several stages, which it can become especially in the sustained process of therapy​[17]​. Empathy involves “response with the object (matching responses as with distress to distress or joy to joy), and response to the object (instrumental responses as with consolation to distress or fear to anger)”​[18]​. Preston and de Waal go so far as to propose a concept of empathy in which “individuals of many species are distressed by the distress of a conspecific and will act to terminate the object’s distress, even incurring risk to themselves”​[19]​. They propose this non-human-specific concept on the basis of reports of some disturbing experiments on rhesus monkeys and rats.​[20]​ 

Empathy designates the process by which emotions are experienced as the result of an encounter with an other, whether immediate or through the distanced audiovisual process of witness. The emotions are provoked by the perceived experience and the perceived feelings of the other. It therefore implies that the other must be recognised as having a similar (if not identical) status as that which witnesses attributes to themselves. Witnesses have to recognise the other as being like themselves if they are to experience empathic emotions. Hence there is no real empathy with the many incidental victims of an action movie. The genre has an implicit assumption that there are three classes of individuals: characters who are or seem to be good; characters who are evil; and the hapless drones who carry out the intents of the evil characters. These drones are attributed no personhood. They exist in relation to plot and to the gleeful celebration of destruction that is the particular pleasure of the genre. When the personhood of the other is recognised by the person who witnesses, then empathy follows. This empathy can be intellectual or emotional or a combination of the two. Personhood is socially attributed: the long struggle to recognise slaves as full persons being a case in point. 

Empathy requires that the witness acknowledges the status of the other as a person. Arguably, the rapid development of the audiovisual has contributed, through its ability to present the distant as a simulation of presence, to a wider acceptance of the personhood of remote and different others. It has enabled, and perhaps even required, a recognition of common personhood across the many evident differences in the human race. A more complicated process is yet to come: the attribution of elements of personhood to beings other than humans. Some indications of this process can already be seen. The revulsion at animal testing of human concepts and process (as we might feel at the experiments reported by Preston and de Wahl) is one such indication. As this process develops, the notion of ‘personhood’ itself will change. A more ecological personhood would recognise the status of humans as a part of nature, as having natural processes as a constituent part of their personhood rather than as a repressed other to that personhood. Hence the extension of personhood to the higher primates might well result. It should be recognised that personhood is a socially malleable conception. So also is empathy, which depends on the attribution of personhood to the other in order to be able to feel from their position. 

If empathy can be used to designate the feelings that are provoked by distant events witnessed through the audiovisual, then what of the textual structure through which they are provoked? Structures of expectation attach to any audiovisual experience, however short in duration or trivial in content. Just like a feature film or news bulletin, a modest clip on YouTube brings with it a weight of contextual expectations. We are addressed by the texts that we witness: they are made for us by agencies which have their communicative intents. We come to them, voluntarily, expecting to receive what can, despite all the reservations that we might intellectually have about the word, some kind of communication. Any audiovisual text comes with a dense set of expectations and promises. Any audiovisual text equally, though its mobility of vision, will provide the witnessing individual with multiple instances of address, of instances of attempted communication. 

Take, for instance, a simple interview: say, Martin Bashir interviewing Diana Princess of Wales​[21]​. It will involve us, through empathy, with the evident distress of the Princess. But any interview involves a further series of communicative acts which complicate this empathy. The Princess herself has reasons for giving the interview (or submitting to it: both terms, significantly, are in common use). Even as we empathise, we are aware of the calculation behind her statements.  Bashir adds another layer of intentionality. This is an exchange rather than the Princess ‘just talking’. It has its own rules; one of which is that of the interviewer’s search for some kind of truth. The institution of the BBC, broadcasting the interview, brings its own reputation as a series of implied, framing statements. The placing within the BBC and its flagship Panorama programme means that this exchange is both important and trustworthy. In addition, this being the medium of broadcasting, we are aware that this whole textual assemblage is not addressed to us specifically but, as Paddy Scannell put it so felicitously, to “anyone as someone”. So we are aware of the general address of what we are seeing, and can be curious and perhaps even concerned about the reactions of others. A sense of what others might say or do also bears down on such exchanges. This being the case, what are we meant to feel?

We witness through a series of communicative attempts. Diana, Bashir, Panorama, the BBC, and virtual others within the exchange are all involved in a process through which they attempt to communicate. Just because Diana says something, it does not mean that she succeeds in communicating at any level, either in communicating facts, conveying a perspective or generating an empathic response. The same goes for every single one of the participants, real or virtual. It is important to realise that, through the audiovisual, we are witnessing attempts at communication, rather than experiencing communication. Communicative attempts are never transparent. They come from someone and somewhere. They encounter witnesses who are also located in other spaces and times. So their reception is uncertain, equivocal and not univocal. Aspects of these communicative attempts may work, others not. This will tend to be different even at an individual level, although generalisations can be made.

The distinction between intellectual empathy and empathetic emotions, however provisional, seems to be useful to clarify the conflicting and intermingling feelings which are provoked. In the Bashir interview, direct empathetic emotions are felt in response to the Princess with her heavy mascara’d eyes, her awkward posture and hesitant speech. These feelings tend to be intensified by the nature of the dialogue with Bashir, his gentle questioning within an ambiguous mise-en-scene that is both domestic and official. An intellectual empathy partially conflicts with these emotions. That same unusually heavy mascara may lead us to suspect the Princess’s motives as being more calculating and less a direct expression of her distress. But above all, intellectual empathy is an empathy with the virtual others in this exchange. These virtual others include those whom the interlocutors, (the Princess and Bashir) are discussing. What will they feel about what she is saying about her crowded marriage with Prince Charles, and how will they react? What will be the reactions of those many, nameless yet somehow known others who are presumed to be watching at the same time. 

These conjoined empathies set up something of a conflict, but a productive conflict. This conflict is essentially one of emotional ambiguity, of knowing what you feel yet at the same time not knowing quite how to feel. This emotional ambiguity is underpinned by the constitutive ambiguity of the audiovisual, its status as there-ness yet textuality. This emotional ambiguity is of course resolved, but outside the text. We think about it, talk about it, come to a conclusion of some kind, or dismiss the whole thing as a passing show of no great consequence. The extratextual resolves the ambiguity of the textual, as empirical researchers are beginning to understand by looking at conversations with and around TV material which take place as  programmes unroll as well as after watching. This emotional ambiguity is also the production, within the text itself, of the ‘proper distance’ called for by Silverstone. 

Silverstone tends, in his last book, to examining the text as text rather than an alliance of ‘thereness’ and textuality which gives rise to a complexity of reactions. He is therefore forced into an untypically pessimistic view that ‘proper distance’ is not currently achieved in broadcasting​[22]​. Instead he finds “a kind of polaristion in the determinations of distance”. He goes on:
 “On the one hand we find ourselves being positioned by media representations as so removed from the lives and worlds of other people that they seem beyond the pale, beyond reach of care of compassion and certainly beyond reach of any meaningful or productive action. […] Per contra the representation, just as frequent and just as familiar, of the other as being just like us, as recoupable without disturbance in our own world and values has, though perhaps more benignly, the same consequence. We refuse to recognise not only that others are not like us, but that they cannot be made to be like us. … Such cultural neo-imperialism represents the other side of the immorality of distance, in its refusal to accept difference, in its resistance to recognizing and to valuing the stranger”​[23]​

Both responses may well be felt, but as a stage in a larger process of negotiating empathic responses and working through the many forms of address that compose a contemporary audiovisual text. Both responses imply an exaggeratedly high degree of emotional selectivity when witnessing events through an audiovisual text. There is quite literally a world of difference between recognising individuals as “just like us” rather than just “like us”. To witness distant individuals and to recognise them as persons is inevitably to see them as “like us”. Yet this recognition involves both sameness and distance, the imaginative attempt to feel what they are feeling and the simultaneous knowledge that they are them and we are us. The position from which we witness is a mobile one, involving twists and turns of emotional empathy rather than one fixed position of identification or rejection. We see not only those who we might construe as “just like us” but others as well, in the same scene or in the next shot: others who may be more or less sympathetic, more or less authoritative, more or less persuasive, more or less in accordance with one or more of our fantasy selves. The textual construction of witness offers differing points of view, positioning us at once with the individuals whom we witness, the concrete others who are also interviewed or seen in the same reports or documentaries, and the virtual others (both people and institutions) who are also involved in the exchange.
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